Post-Positivism and Social Science.

 In the social sciences, the selection of research design and its constituent elements is an important phase of the research process.  The choice of research design is subject to a number of theoretical and methodological considerations.  Within the discipline of sociology, there exists a high level of theoretical and methodological pluralism with competing approaches to the study of society being pursued simultaneously which often gives rise to contention and contestation over the relative value of approaches. While quantitative research has relatively well-established principles of evaluation, appraisal of qualitative research is highly contentious. Carter and Little (2007) have suggested that consistency of research design is an important criterion via which to evaluate qualitative research:  epistemology, methodology and methods have to be internally consistent in order to form a solid research design. Adoption of a particular epistemological stance can affect researcher’s methodological choices, as some forms of epistemology are inconsistent with certain methodologies.  In view of this problem and to demonstrate the logic of research design, the constituent parts of epistemology, theory, methodology and methods will be given further exposition and organized via the principles of post-positivist epistemology into a consistent model of research design.  

The Chomsky-Foucault Debate.

See also:

- Seduction and Panopticism
-Ideology and Symbolic power: Between Althusser and Bourdieu.

Adolf Hitler on Standpoint-Epistemology.

Of course, Hitler didn’t live long enough to rub shoulders with supporters of foucauldian discourse theory, feminist-standpoint epistemology or any form of ‘post-modern’ sociological analysis and the parallel does not invalidate their position. But, Rob Moore’s use of the quote in Towards the Sociology of The Truth was a delicious if somewhat cheeky deployment of the dictator’s views to attack epistemological relativism, which is self-undermining and damaging to the discipline of sociology if taken too seriously. As of now, I’m only a couple chapters into the work but I’ve found nothing to quibble with and find myself nodding and agreeing - perhaps, that’s a fault in and of itself but I’d recommend it to anyone interested in the sociology of knowledge, science or education.

Human Rights and Cultural Relativism.

The modern view of human rights is the result of successive struggles within Western society. Hence, in historical terms, human rights are a ‘Western’ construct. However this does not undermine the claim of cross-cultural validity, but merely problematizes the issue of cultural rights and their relation to the universal claims of the human rights tradition. This tension and the normative variety of cultural relativism have been crucial points of contestation in human rights theory. Thus, the extent to which human rights are inherently ‘Western’ in character is of vital importance to their practical implantation across cultural divisions. To address this issue, the historical origins of human rights will be briefly sketched and their cross-cultural legitimacy will be evaluated to determine the appropriate cultural designation of human rights.

The question of historical origin, Micheline Ishay argues, is complicated because selection of this point ipso facto “privileges a specific status quo or value-system” and can be used to legitimize and delegitimize historical actors. Following this, the cultural antecedents of human rights and their compatibility with previous value-systems both within and outside Europe has caused considerable contention. However, the intellectual crystallization of both human rights and cultural relativism originate in Europe. The human rights tradition developed out of the intellectual, socio-economic and political transformations of the Enlightenment period and the antecedents of normative cultural relativism can be partially sourced from the birth of cultural nationalism with the consolidation of Germany and Italy in the early 1870s. In this sense, both human rights and cultural relativism are ‘Western’ constructs. However, Jack Donnelly contends that modern human rights are the product of and reaction to abuses prevalent in modernity.Ergo, the development capitalism and bureaucratic nation-state is the vital fulcrum in the evolution of human rights and not the special qualities inherent in pre-modern ‘Western’ value-systems. Furthermore, the spread of both capitalism and nation-states throughout the globe generalises a similar set of abuses that gave rise to the human rights tradition in Europe. Donnelly’s argument is an attempt to firmly ground universal human rights without reference to universal anthropological or ontological claims that he finds empirically indefensible.


The weakness of such universalisms can give credence to normative cultural relativism that is diametrically opposed to the modern conception of human rights. He argues, given a unique historical confluence, that human rights represent the best means to combat threats to human dignity, despite the fact of cultural relativity. In defence of universal human rights claims, Donnelly offers several criticisms of cultural relativism and empirical arguments that attempt to demonstrate the “relative universality” of human rights.


Cultural relativism can be conceptualized in two broad forms. The term cultural relativism was first employed within the discipline of anthropology and referred to a methodological approach to the problem of cultural relativity and ethnocentric biases that undermined objective analysis of different cultures and value systems. Thus, from this methodological approach cultural systems can be analysed in their own terms to ascertain the functional interplay of social practices. From a normative perspective, cultural relativity is given moral force and cross-cultural moral evaluation is reduced to the status of reproducing ethnocentrism. Moreover, claims to universal human right would represent a form of cultural imperialism and signpost the hegemony of the West. From a pragmatic standpoint, cultural relativism provides no means to arbitrate between competing rights claims in a cross-cultural international system. However, this does not imply that cultural relativism is false, per se, but empirically grounded arguments can demonstrate the widespread appeal of human rights and historical tendencies that propel universal human rights claims across cultural divisions.


There is prima facie evidence for the cross-cultural validity of human rights in the widespread adoption of human rights language throughout the globe and the development of non-western human rights organizations. In view of this, Michael Goodhart has argued that human rights need not be grounded in a conception of universality, the continued proliferation of human right’s influenced discourse and organizations testify to its cross-cultural validly beyond its origin in Western Europe. Donnelly moves beyond this prima facie evidence and attempts to ground human right in a “relative universality” that leaves space for “second order claims of relativism”.


Unlike traditional Enlightenment philosophy, that often based rights claims on an a priori conception of the autonomous individual, Donnelly’s appeal to universality is circumscribed by historical contingencies. With the development of capitalism, the nation-state and the rise of the bourgeoisie class rights claims were advanced to counter the traditional authority of the aristocracy and monarchy. The success of these initial claims to rights propagated further rights claims for the advancement of marginalized groups. Karl Marx noted that universal suffrage, a political right, was essentially a “socialistic” measure, so much more than political events on the continent. Thus, with the spread of capitalism and nation-states a case can be made for what Donnelly called “functional universality”, human rights amounting to the best functional response to these transformations. Moreover, the universalism of human rights allowed for the critique of existing conditions relative to normative standards. In fact, human rights discourse has been invoked to redress the excess of power exercised by Western powers in the international system.


The process of decolonization that occurred in the aftermath of the Second World War was often lead by figures educated in the Western tradition of rights. Thus, as Ishay notes, human rights has often been adopted as the language of resistance to power and cultural relativism is adopted to redress marginal groups inability to gain access to social, political and economic rights. In this sense, cultural relativism is one strategy to redress the failure to extend human rights to marginalized groups. Both the human rights tradition and cultural relativism are of European origin. However, both are adapted and adopted by non-western societies and therefore cannot be considered exclusively western.


The European origin of human rights is a historical fact, from the intellectual fervor of the Enlightenment and the socio-economic and political transformation that brought forth the capitalist market system and the nation-state, the human rights tradition developed to combat threats to human dignity and curb excesses of arbitrary power. However, as Donnelly argued, “cultures are immensely malleable” and the development of human rights stemmed more from the problems inherent in modernity than the uniqueness of pre-modern Western culture. The spread of capitalism and nation-state has led to similar threats to human dignity worldwide, in light of this, human rights as conceived of in the Western world have developed a level of functional universality and need not be grounded in universal anthropological and ontological claims. The fact of cultural relativity need not necessarily attain normative power; cultural relativism is often the maladaptive response to failures to extend human rights. Moreover, the use of human rights discourse to resist Western power and the spread of non-Western human rights organization further bolster the argument that human rights are not an inherently Western construct, despite their historical origins.

Written by Mathew Toll.

Bibliography.

Donnelly, Jack. (2007), “The Relative Universality of Human Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 281-306.


Cmiel, Kenneth. (2004), “The Recent History of Human Rights”, American Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 1, pp.117-135.


Goodhart, Michael. (2008), “Neither Relative nor Universal: A Response to Donnelly”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 30, No.1, pp. 183-193.


Ishay, Micheline. (2004), “What Are Human Rights? Six Historical Controversies”, Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 3. No. 3, pp.359-371.



Pegram, Thomas. (2010), “Diffusion Across Political Systems: The Global Spread of National Human Rights Institutions”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 3., pp. 729-760.

“No Maps for These Territories”

Traversing through cyberspace today, I came across a little gem “No Maps for These Territories” featuring the man who coined the term cyberspace, cyberpunk novelist William Gibson. It’s a meditation on our nature as ‘mediated’ human-beings, the extent of technological saturation in our quotidian lives and our desire to produce extended networks of prosthetics. Not to mention, he delves into the process of writing and the nature of fiction, of the relationship between our conscious self and the unconsciousness. Well worth the watch, enjoy.

EDIT: The youtube user who had hosted this removed it. However, here is the trailer:

Seduction and Panopticism

Michel Foucault (2002, p. 343) once wrote: “a society without power relations can only be an abstraction”. In contemporary sociology, the ubiquity of power is beyond contestation and forms a fundamental axiom of the field. Beyond this however, the exact nature and dimension of power dynamics are subject to varied interpretations and formulations. Foucault’s discussion of power, disciplinary society, panopticism, and related concepts offer substantive contributions to further studies of relations and economies of power within advanced capitalist societies. The notion of panopticism has enjoyed particular resonance, and contributed to the development of surveillance studies (Simon, 2005, p. 2). Moreover, Foucault’s metaphoric use of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon is a standard reference for theorists who advance the “surveillance society” thesis; such theorists contend that the primary mechanism of social control in modern society is surveillance and the internalization of surveillance by the population which in turn molds individuals into self-surveilling subjects (Boyne, 2000, p. 293; Yar, 2003, pp. 255-256). Criticisms of this thesis have stressed the importance of “mechanisms of seduction”, that within contemporary society control is largely maintained by “enjoyment imperatives” and not through surveillance (Boyne, 2000, pp. 285-286). Discussion of the so-called surveillance society and mechanisms of seduction draw into question the continued relevance of Foucault’s notion of panopticism.

Through a discussion of these issues, the conclusion to be reached in this essay will reaffirm the importance of Foucault’s panopticism, concurrent with mechanisms of seduction that engender social conformity. Hence, the thesis that modern society constitutes a surveillance society will be rejected on the basis that it over-emphasizes one mechanism of power and social control. Firstly however, to establish a firm basis for this analysis, Foucault’s theory of the formation of disciplinary society and the nature of panopticism have to be given fuller explanation. The backdrop of Foucault’s analysis is the transition away from what Gilles Deleuze’s (1992, p. 3) labeled “societies of sovereignty” that characterized Europe before the end of the 18th century. The model of sovereignty that underpinned monarchal and absolutist regimes were based upon the premise of deduction, the power of the sovereign was asserted through subtractive mechanisms (Foucault, 1998, pp. 135-136).

In the first section of Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1991, pp. 3-6) quilted together a series of eye-witness accounts to the public execution of Damiens in 1757 for the crime of attempted regicide. The punishment was carried out according to a strict symbolism that mirrored the crime; this jurisprudence, Vico had noted, formed “an entire poetics” (Foucault, 1991, p. 45). Through this method of punishment, the sovereign had confronted the criminal on the level of the body, in a purely negative form with an excess of force that demonstrated the supremacy of sovereign power in a retributive ritual. For the moralist and reformer of the 18th century, this surplus-violence betrayed a tyrannical excess and inefficiency in its economy of power (Foucault, 1991, p.73). From the 17th to 19th centuries, there was a series of subtle transformation that modified the state and disciplinary mechanisms. Toward the end of that period, social order was no longer primarily maintained through the spectacle of punishment, but increasingly through surveillance and the internalization of disciplines (Foucault, 1991, pp. 216-217).

The proliferation of disciplinary techniques and the intensification of social surveillance saw the formation of a new economy of power that reduced the costs, economic and political, related to mechanisms of control, whilst maximizing the returns of docile bodies geared toward increased utility and efficiency (Foucault, 1991, p. 218-219). This general confluence of social observation and disciplinary tactics united in what Foucault (1991, p 9) term a general “disciplinary society”. Of paramount importance for the functionality of this disciplinary society was the deployment of panoptical apparatus that served to observe individuals and their interactions. Foucault’s (1991, p.205) notion of varied panoptical apparatuses or a general social “panopticism” were derived from Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, which represented for Foucault “the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form”.

Bentham’s panopticon was an unrealized architectural design. Bentham (1995, p. 31) described his plan as an “inspection house” the multifaceted applications of which could lead to: “morals reformed – health preserved – industry invigorated – instruction diffused”. The two mechanism it utilized to attain these effects was individuation and constant visibility (Foucault, 1991, p. 201). The circular design of the panopticon, with the individual cells arranged on the outer edge of the building allowed for a central vantage point, from which it is possible to observe all occupants and impossible for the occupants to see the observer. Each individual occupant immediately individuated and identifiable, conscious of their constant condition of being under surveillance internalizes their surveillance and begins to regulate their own behavior. Foucault (1991, p. 201) identified this as the efficiency of panopticism it: “assures the automatic functioning of power”.

Panopticism contrary to the Sovereign power, is de-individualized -“a faceless gaze that transformed the whole social body into a field of perception” – it is also “de-institutionalized” and it not centered in the state: church groups, charities, schools and private individuals can all serve as points of social surveillance (Foucault, 1991, pp. 211-214). More contemporary discussions of panopticism and the power of surveillance focus upon the dissemination of technological advancements that function like Foucault’s (1991, 211) “faceless gaze” such as closed circuit televisions or CCTVs (Simon, 2005, p. 6). It is estimated that there are approximately 21,000 surveillance cameras in the United Kingdom alone, it some locals these CCTV systems are linked up with face-recognition program which allow for the individuation of surveillance despite the open dynamics of the space (Boyne, 2000, p. 298). The importance of these new surveillance technologies is undeniable, and their panoptical dimensions are irrefutable. However, this does not preclude the importance of seduction mechanisms in the maintenance of social order.

Herbert Marcuse (1972, p. 21) argued that consumption patterns serve a further ideological function in the maintenance of capitalism rather then merely in the economic sphere. Through the development of mass culture there is a levelling out of contrast, when individuals of hostile social groups attain satisfaction through the same cultural products. This superficial “equalization of class distinctions”, as expressed by Marcuse (1972, p. 21) unifies the population in a desire for ‘needs’, which support the continuance of the establishment. The predominance of consumption and sensation seeking, Zygmunt Bauman argued, is “a condition sine qua non of being amenable to seduction” (Boyne, 2000, p. 298). In Bauman’s view then, panopticism is an outmoded form of social control given the positive incentives and imperatives indicative of conformity to social norms (Boyne, 2000, p. 298). Bauman is right to highlight the importance of seduction, however, panoptical mechanisms are not rendered redundant. Surveillance of individuals is often used in the social manipulation of their desires, advertisers utilize “cookies” to monitor individual internet usage and therefore tailor their advertisements to the observed individual (Boyne, 2000, p. 297). Mechanisms of seduction, therefore, coexist with panoptical apparatus.

Surveillance is a significant feature of modern society, technological advancement have changed the nature of panopticism as exhibited in the late19th and early 20th century. However, given the importance of seduction mechanisms and other modes of control it seems inappropriate and overzealous to describe social order predominantly in terms of surveillance. Marcuse’s analysis of varied consumption pattern’s and there ultimate conservative function underscores the point. Despite this, Foucault’s description of panopticism remains an important contribution to understanding contemporary power relations. In particular, the partial de-individualization of power-relations and the active involvement of the entire social body in exercising the ability to enable or disable modes of behavior – subject itself to the cynical manipulation of privileged discourse and institutions: at which point, seduction mechanisms and panopticism meet.

Written by Mathew Toll.
Bibliography.

Boyne, Roy, (2000), “Post-Panopticism”, Economy and Society, Vol 29, No 2, pp 285-307.

Deleuze, Gilles, (1992), “Postscript on the Societies of Control”, October, Vol 59, pp 3-7.

Foucault, Michel, (1991), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Trans Alan Sheridan, London: Penguin Books.

Foucault, Michel, (1998), The Will To Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Vol one, Trans Robert Hurley, London: Penguin Books.

Foucault, Michel, (2002), “The Subject and Power”, Power: Essential Works of Foucault: 1954-1984, Vol three, Edited James D. Faubion, Trans Robert Hurley and others, London: Penguin books, pp. 326-348.

Marcuse, Herbert. (1972), One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society, London: Abacus.

Simon, B, (2005), “The Return of Panopticsm: Supervision, Subjection and the New Surveillance”, Surveillance and Society, vol 3, no 1, pp. 1-20.

(Written, late 2009)

Žižek on Cultural Studies.

“Some moths before writings this, at an art round table, I was asked to comment on a painting I had seen there for the first time. I did not have any idea about it, and so I engaged in a total bluff, which went something like this: the frame of the painting in front of us is not its true frame; there is another, invisible, frame, implied by the structure of the painting, and these two frame do not overlap – there is an invisible gap separating the two. The pivotal content of the painting is not rendered in its visible part, but is located in this dislocation of the two frames, in the gap that separates them. Are we, today, in our post-modern madness, still able to discern the traces of the gap? Perhaps more than the reading of a painting hinges on it; perhaps the decisive dimension of humanity will be lost when we lose the capacity to discern this gap…to my surprise, this brief intervention was a huge success, and many following participants referred to the dimension in-between-the-two-frames, elevating it into a term. This very success made me sad, really sad. What I encountered here was not only the efficiency of a bluff, but a much more radical apathy at the very heart of today’s cultural studies” - Slavoj Žižek, from "The Universal Exeption".

"After The Orgy"

"The orgy in question is the moment when modernity
exploded on us, the moment of liberation in every
sphere. Political liberation, sexual liberation, liberation
of the forces of production, liberation of the forces of
destruction, women’s liberation, children’s liberation,
liberation of unconscious drives, liberation of art. . . .
This was a total orgy—an orgy of the real, the rational,
the sexual, of criticism as of anti-criticism, of development
as a crisis of development. . . . Now everything has
been liberated, the chips are down, and we find ourselves
faced collectively with the big question: WHAT
DO WE DO NOW THAT THE ORGY IS OVER? Now all
we can do is simulate the orgy, simulate liberation."

- Jean Baudrillard, in "The Transparency of evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena".

It has to be said, Baudrillard is terribly flippant.

The Conservative Praxis of Postmodernism.

“That was the gift of the French. They gave Americans a language they did not need. It was like the Statue of Liberty. Nobody needs French theory.” — Jean Baudrillard (1)

In the post-May 68 intellectual climate postmodernism ascended from an emergent philosophy to a mainstay in university humanities faculties. These stars of the French intellectual scene set out to critique and deconstruct the enlightenment tradition. But as Foucault informed us we should not ‘blackmail’ a thinker into being either for or against the enlightenment. Therefore following this line it is not as simply to say that because a postmodernist critiques the enlightenment that the theorist represents a revolt of unreason against rationality in social life. Jacques-Benigne Bossuet and Thomas Hobbes both advocated political absolutism, but the philosophical system backed by Hobbes shifted the justification of government from divinity of the sovereign to practicality and utility for its constituents. Enlightenment philosophers took Hobbes’ naturalistic approach and built onto it while removing other elements, concluding in favour of democratic and republican ideals which Hobbes had hoped to fight. The political and philosophical systems put forward by Enlightenment philosophers though were not monolithic, having contained within their ambiguous definitions many differences of opinion. But one can assured they favoured relatively progressive forms of political activity with their naturalistic methods and notions of progress, truth and justice.

Postmodernists have sought to challenge all notion of universality, hierarchy of values, binary opposition and grand-narratives. Through challenging traditional notions of the subject and society, post-modernists have been associated with left-wing politics. However, their philosophical systems do nothing but create a problematic foundation for the engagement in critique.

The concept of practical criticism or critique implies two parts, negative and positive. Critical negativity finds the object of criticism deficient in some form. The negativity leads to the positive which is the affirmation of a value or attribute found deficient in the object criticised. In Praxis, negativity manifests itself in negation and the positive manifests itself in the product of transformation. Transformative politics necessarily implies criticism of current political establishment, both in its theoretical foundation and its institutions and theoretical foundations and hypothetical institutions to replace the negated. Post-modern criticism is Deconstructionist in that it seeks to critique forms of hegemony, but unlike practical criticism does not seek an alternative hegemony. Derrida defined this though not as a nihilism but rather openness to an unknown ‘other’. The absence of a signified transformative goal undermines the ability to produce practical critique in the pursuit of progressive change, a quintessential quality of left-wing politics.

To take a literary example, Graham Greene’s short story “The Destructors” features a gang of youths who systematically deconstruct a house, at first superficially, until they remove the very foundations which hold the structure together; the day after, the house falls over. The gang’s act of deconstruction renders the house a pile of rubble; they have destroyed and created anew with new possibilities of creation. Our lead on the gang’s story breaks off at that point. Deconstructionist criticism echoes this story of an East London gang in that they are anti-‘what is’ but have no ‘to be,’ and thus their deconstruction doesn’t necessarily follow to progressive developments.

In all probability, deconstruction could lead to reactionary, even fascist developments in that, for example, human rights are a Universalist ideal system, and therefore a hegemonic construct. If we approach human rights from a radical subjectivist position we undermine the hegemonic concept and thus render it useless.

The nomothetic discourses which construct the notions of human rights and justice stand between postmodernists and the further degradation of human dignity. For as we know human rights are not universally respected by all, particularly Western governments who claim positive universal values as they push forward their own national and corporate interests under the guise of a false cosmopolitanism. To infer from this situation that ‘Western Civilization’ and philosophy are oppressive at a fundamental level, i.e. it’s championing of rationality and hierarchy of values is a misapprehension of modernity’s challenges.

The crisis in Western Civilization is not caused by the application of rationality but the misuse of rationality. It’s the creation of ‘Rational-choice theories’ whose logic is based on a series of assumptions eventually divorcing itself from actuality when it fails to adapt. A prime example of this process is the discipline of economics, an underlying principle of which is the presumption of scarcity and thus the necessity of a market. Scarcity in resources has marred human society since time immemorial, till recent times when technological developments have increased the production levels of essential commodities to the point that scarcity is now artificially created. Sustaining an illogical price system serves not the ‘unlimited wants’ of the people but rather the sectional interest of power elites and corporations. This construct of principles breaks with the idea of a rational-choice theory which should be aimed at satisfying human needs on a Utilitarian basis.

This failure of the Western establishment and global economy should not be combated by undercutting our ability to make rational-choices and values in the pursuit of progressive enlightenment ideals. Postmodernist have pushed in the face of such challenges theories of cultural relativism, that values are cultural constructions and therefore to say that one value superior to another is foolhardy and even racist when involving inter-cultural discourse. Therefore we cannot declare the universality of the right to life because that creates a hierarchy of values; one which is in contradiction to other cultures i.e. death penalties in the USA or public beheadings in Saudi Arabia.

This denial of ones ability to choose one value over another serve only to sustain the value currently entrenched. Therefore by virtue of logical necessity postmodernism’s ultra-radical break with ‘convention’ becomes rather conservative. Left-wing politics and affirmation of value are firmly based on the enlightenment/modernist worldview, in the words of Marshall Berman:

“I have been arguing that those of us who are most critical of modern life need modernism most, to show us where we are and where we can begin to change our circumstances and ourselves. In search of a place to begin, I have gone back to one of the first and greatest of modernists, Karl Marx. I have gone to him not so much for his answers as for his questions. The great gift he can give us today, it seems to me, is not a way out of the contradictions of modern life but a surer and deeper way into these contradictions. He knew that the way beyond the contradictions would have to lead through modernity, not out of it.”(2)

We cannot go to ‘post-modernity’, we can only engage in the modernist project of shaping our world, of ‘taking our epoch on our shoulders paying for it today and forever’.

Written by Mathew Toll.

Notes.

1) "Continental Drift: Questions for Jean Baudrillard," Deborah Salomon, New York Times Magazine, November 2005.
2) All that is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity, Marshall Berman (Verso, London 1997) pp. 128–9.

(Written late 2005 or early 2006)