Showing posts with label Sociology. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Sociology. Show all posts

Saturday, October 2, 2021

Do house price increases negatively affect fertility intentions and fertility?

New paper by Ang Li (and co-authors Kadir Atalay & Stephen Whelan from the University of Sydney) looks at the effect of house price increases on renters and homeowners fertility intentions and fertility outcomes in Australia.  Housing affordability has been a big issue in Australia for some time and the impact of decreasing affordability has been linked to declining fertility rates. Atalay, Li and Whelan using data from the HILDA survey find that increasing house prices have different effects for homeowners and renters. Here is the abstract: 

There is increasing evidence that housing and housing markets impact a variety of behaviors and outcomes. Using a rich panel of Australian microlevel data, we estimated the effect of housing price changes on both fertility intentions and fertility outcomes. The analysis indicates that the likelihood of having a child among homeowners is positively related to an increase in housing wealth. The positive housing wealth effect has the greatest impact on the fertility and fertility intentions of Australian homeowners who are young and mortgage holders. In comparison, there is evidence that increases in housing prices decrease the fertility intentions of private renters with children.

The full paper can be viewed here: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2021.101787

This paper is based on a chapter of Ang Li's PhD thesis which can be found here: http://hdl.handle.net/2123/18877

Wednesday, February 26, 2020

Review: The New Authoritarianism: Trump, Populism, and the Tyranny of Experts




This post is a review I wrote of Salvatore Babones's book 'The New Authoritarianism'  for Good reads a couple of years ago. I intended to write an extended post on the book for the blog but never did. So here is the original review:

Babones offers an account of a “new authoritarianism”: an illiberal transformation of liberalism from the classical philosophy of individual freedom to a rights-based discourse that ‘empowers’ people on their behalf and removes rights from the realm of democratic contestation.

This transformation of liberalism is underpinned by the authority (or rather tyranny) of a new liberal expert class of professionals and managers that control liberal institutions, nationally and globally, and filter the range of policy options presented to the voting population.

This is an intriguing thesis – elements of the argument ring true. Garrett Hardin suggested that human right frameworks that enshrined freedom to breed forbade policy action that could save the world from overpopulation and Malthusian crisis.

Not that many people would forgo that right and it seems that the demographic transformation will not render it a necessity. It is obvious that constructing a universal right is at least an attempt to put it beyond the realm of political contestation – or at least makes political challenge harder and less legitimate. And supernational institutions, when conceded too, explicitly shift the site of control.

Babones sees this as limiting the sovereignty of the demos and establishing a sovereignty of experts. And It is this that Babones sees as the relevant background for understanding nativist and populist discontent.

The rhetoric of global elites, liberal elites, EU apparatchiks concentrated in liberal enclaves that pervades political discourse would suggest that there is something to this account – at least as far as it reflects the populist imagination.

Babones provides a description of the sociological basis for the support of both new authoritarianism and populism. Socio-economic class, occupational order, and migration status are the axes that predispose groups towards the liberal consensus or an attempt to break this through populist strategies.

It is not hard to see, in the years following the breakdown of the ‘great moderation’ supposedly ensured by the management of neo-liberal economic experts and the financial crisis, that groups most hurt by these economic changes have a distrust of experts and mainstream institutions.

Babones’ account of the 2016 US election had an interesting discussion of the divergent class trajectories among American woman and the split between those who could imagine themselves running for office themselves one day and those more concerned with stagnate real wages and underemployment.

It was this latter group, among white women, that were more likely to side with Trump.

Elements of a political economy of the rise of populism and new authoritarianism thread throughout the book and I would have liked to read more about this. And the relationship between these political economic shifts and neoliberalism.

Another quibble is the lose use of the term 'liberalism' throughout the book. Babones talks about the linguistic confusion that arose when F.D.R. developed a more 'progressive' interpretation of classical liberalism without acknowledging that he was changing the meaning of the term. It isn't always clear what version of the term he is employing and therefore talking about a generic liberalism obscures the extent to which other political traditions have help establish modern political systems, including international human rights frameworks.

Babones' suggestion for dealing with these two political trends is to more fully engage with a democratic politics that puts real policy options in front of the voters -- trusting the demos to run the polis and moving beyond the consensus of the expert class.

This book, offering an account of populism, could be seen as a justification of Brexit and Trump. It isn't hard to see that an account of 'new authoritarianism' that identities liberal experts as limiting democratic processes could be seen to embolden right-populists.

Yet, understanding these concerns is extremely important. Why do people challenge experts and the elites of the global cities? How do we get people to invest in their democracy and keep it strong? - I think those who read this book, especially those of a certain occupational order, should remember this quote by Robert Louis Stevenson: "the truth that is suppressed by friends is the readiest weapon of the enemy".

Wednesday, September 18, 2019

An Examination of the Violence of Abjection and Suffering During the Holocaust


Society is underpinned by standards and expectations as to what social worlds should resemble and operate. But when the very foundations of that world are rocky and open to misuse and abuse, the society is left in a destabilized position. What remains is the question of how these worlds are tolerated in this destabilized form? Can they continue indefinitely in such a way? This place of discomfort is the abject, that which is contrary to everyday harmony. Often the locus of the abject can be expressed in violence. In the case of the Holocaust the abject impacted the individual Jewish people and the wider community of Germany and the world. The meaning that was derived to spark the violence and the meaning that remains are in stark contrast.

Prior to the Holocaust the Jewish people were not abject to their community, but with a little guidance and propaganda they were led to a mass hysteria that the world hopes to never witness again. During Europe’s enlightened period the annihilation of over 5 million Jews and Gypsies occurred in Europe without a blink of an eye. It was tolerated, accepted and some leaders such as the Vichy government of France contributed to the Nazi effort by gathering their Jews and handing them over to the German’s to protect themselves as best they could from the German occupational army. The fear that gripped Europe and strangled the very humanity out of those in power validated and added meaning to the Nazi ideology. As their power increased through the pain and suffering of individuals within those social worlds their domination over the region continued to surge. If violence is triadic in generating meaning it requires a victim, perpetrator and witness, thus in having the people of Europe witness the demise of the vile cancerous Jew they saw the power of the Nazi’s in ability to control and strip the rights of its own population and later other parts of Europe. As Foucault states “...public execution did not re- establish justice; it reactivated power” (1977: 49).

The purpose behind the Nazi violence was the establishment of control over its people with a goal of world domination. Violence as abjection is something contrary to the human condition, it impacts individuals and the community in the sense that it cannot be tolerated, but what happens when it is tolerated as in Nazi Germany. How does a community bear witness to suffering and pain of the Jewish people and accept it as normal? How does meaning produced by violence make it acceptable on any terms? The use of abjection by Hitler to create distinctions and validate the actions taken against the European Jews, through propaganda and unsubstantiated claims marked the period. Violence that creates meaning rarely does so for those that it violates, typically the impetus is to incite fear and terror. In the case of the holocaust, the violence served as a means of creating fear in the hearts of the Jews throughout Europe and their sympathizers, so that no one would stand in the way of what Hitler viewed as a necessary task to remove the impurities from his nation. The violence impacted both the Jews and Gypsies and the worlds in which they both belong and are outcast.

Hitler’s use of “transcendental genocide...is based on theories of the absolute need to eliminate all members of a category, because of their intractable vileness, wickedness, dangerousness or opposition” (Preez 1994: 11). Hitler portrayed the Jews as the root cause of all that was wrong with Germany and the only means of recreating all that was once great in their national identity and nation through the elimination of that which contaminated the German State and world alike. Jews were described to be “a cancer within the German social body” (Appagurai 1998: 913) this statement highlights this use of the abject to discredit the Jew’s as people with rights that belong within society. Here they are likened to disease which is always to be eradicated. They are the parasites taking jobs and the livelihood for the German people; hence the governments created this state of emergency whereby the suspension of rational though and disgust at the policies that strip people of their dignity and identity. This served as a further means of creating the Jew as the ‘other’, so that good German folk did not have a problem bearing witness to their mass annihilation. As Kristeva (1982: 31) states “the abjection of Nazi crime reaches its apex when death, which, in any case kills me, interferes with what, in my living universe, is supposed to save me from death: childhood, science, among other things.”. This is what makes the Holocaust so difficult a pill to swallow.

During this period perhaps for the German people and especially those in powerful positions perhaps the fact that they did not view Jews in the same vein as themselves, it was easier to carry out the task. As Bauman (1989: 21) asserts “...moral inhibitions against violent atrocities tend to be eroded once three conditions are met...violence is authorized, actions are reutilized, and the victims are dehumanized”. In creating images of the Jews as subhuman, cancerous and abject to the German people it became “...the arbitrary termination of life against the will of the individual and on behalf of the collective will of the state” (Horowitz 1976: 33), for its own protection. As in all types of ethnic cleansing the imagery of the stain or blemish on society that needs to be efficiently removed so as not to impact on the national identity, so too did “...the Nazi theory demanded the elimination of all Jews and many other ‘impurities’ from the nation” (Preez 1994: 11).

If the mass annihilation of the Jew “is unimaginable...its representation must be fit into existing, acceptable discourses: patriotism, retaliation for real and imagined past injustices, separatism, terrorism, communism, subversion, anarchy, the need to preserve the states and territorial integrity, the need to protect the nation from subversion through ethnic cleansing...” (Nagengast: 120; citing Lyotard: 172). This is what the Nazi party did by making the Jew a distinguishable difference to the German national identity by forcing them to wear the Star of David, by tattooing prisoners of concentration camps with numbers. It created a lasting difference that would forever be recognized a Jewish within that culture. The very fact that each Jew in the concentration camp was numbered dehumanized and removed them as a valuable commodity within that society. They no longer had an identity other than the fact that they were Jewish, similar to that of branding cattle. In this same way “what kept the murdering machine going then was solely its own routine and impetus. The skills of mass murder had to be used simply because they were there” (Bauman 1989: 106) and they were a part of the bureaucracy that failed to see the collective pain of the individuals it destroyed.

The Jewish people were “...shot, hung, electrocuted, gassed to death by [the state]...for political misdeeds: criticism of the state, membership banned political parties or groups, or for adherence to the “wrong” religion; for moral deeds...homosexuality” (Nagengast, 1994: 120). They were no longer accepted as part of the German state hence they were not protected by it. As is typically utilized by certain powers wanting to grasp control of populations, part of that control can involve forcibly removing groups from that national identity that they view as not cohesive. This violence can take the form of genocide against a race or peoples, as they may be classed as outsiders to that nation’s identity. Alternatively, as in the case of Germany, the Jews were seen to be a threat or stain to the national identity. For example, the state of emergency that was created by the Nazi government is highlighted in Article 48 of the Weimar constitution which states:

The president of the Reich may, in the case of a grave disturbance or threat to public security and order, make decisions necessary to re-establish public security, if necessary with the aid of armed forces. To this end he may provisionally suspend the fundamental rights...(Cited by Agamben 1998: 167).

This section of the constitution created a legal loophole for the Reich to decide that those deemed to be ‘threats to public security to have all fundamental rights revoked and “taken into custody”, i.e. concentration camps without question. It is not hard to envisage how easy it was to take advantage of this power within the German constitution. It allowed for rights to be stripped with the wave of a pen.

Through the use of abjection, it became simple to turn the pain of the Jewish people into a silent cry that the German people could not here, it was the ‘other’. As Scarry (1985: 29) affirms “for the torturers, the sheer and simple fact of human agony is made invisible, and the moral fact of inflicting that agony is made neutral by the feigned urgency and significance of the question. For the prisoner, the sheer, simple, overwhelming fact of the world to which the question refers. Intense pain is world destroying”. In the Jewish context it is clear that the Jews had found themselves in an intolerable state in which they were not welcome and were stripped of their very identity for the purpose of mass extermination. Their worlds were forcibly destroyed before their eyes as step by step their identity and rights were forcibly removed, until they had no control or power and were bound off together to be slaughtered and removed from the life and world that they had once known. Their friends and neighbour became enemies, the fear of the unknown and who was a spy for the government, this fear and paranoia is another essence of abjection. The fear that paralyses you to the point where you don’t run you can’t.

The use of abjection to produce meaning in violence that is committed against the ‘other’ can be different from the various viewpoints that people hold. Hitler’s use of the abject and their being likened to a cancerous disease allowed them to be separated and created a collective meaning within the German identity. It reactivated the power of the German government. It reduced the pain and suffering of Europe’s Jews and Gypsies to a silent voice of the powerless. For those that bore witness to the atrocity and found it abject it holds different meaning. The Holocaust is an event in history that will forever plague the world; it was mass murder on a scale never envisioned previously. The meaning derived from this mass atrocity today is very different to its purpose.

It is abject to the very human soul that a society could allow men, women and children to be dehumanized and murdered through a bureaucratic process that belied their human value. As Kristeva states “the abjection of Nazi crime reaches its apex when death which, in any case kills me, interferes with what, in my living universe, is supposed to save me from death: childhood, science, among other things” (1982: 31). This is what made the Holocaust so difficult a pill to swallow. These people were held in various work camps, concentration camps and marked for death, for no crime other than having the wrong identity. For the Jewish people that have been impacted personally or by a family member, their response is to commemorate it so that the world never forgets what it did. Various films have depicted the abject nature of this atrocity, perhaps to create a new meaning, ‘absolute power absolutely corrupts’ and we should not stand by and allow mass atrocities to occur as we are as guilty as the perpetrators. The one message that should be taken from their harrowing experiences is that no human should ever go through that and that there is now meaning in the world that can excuse it.

by Natalia Maystorovich Chulio, written 2009. 

Bibliography


  1. Appadurai, Arjun (1998) ‘Dead Certainty: Ethnic Violence in the Era of Globalization’ in Develop and Change, 29: 905-925.
  2. Agamben, Giorgio (1995) The Camp as the ‘Nomos’ of the Modern in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power & Bare Life, Stanford University Press (Chapter 7) pp166-180.
  3. Bauman, Zygmunt (1989) ‘Social Production of moral indifference’ in Modernity and the Holocaust, Cornell University Press, New York, pp18-23.
  4. Bauman, Zygmunt (1989) ‘The role of Bureaucracy in the Holocaust’ in Modernity and the Holocaust, Cornell University Press, New York, pp104-106.
  5. Du Preez, Peter (1994) Genocide: The Psychology of Mass Murder, Bowerdean Publishing Co. Ltd, London.
  6. Engel, David (2000) The Holocaust: The Third Reich and the Jews, Longman Press, Essex, UK.
  7. Horowitz, Irving (1976) Genocide: State Power and Mass Murder, Transaction Books, New Jersey
  8. Kristeva, Julia (1982) ‘Approaching Abjection’ Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, new York Columbia University Press, pp1-31.
  9. Nagengast, Carol (1994) ‘Violence, Terror and the Crisis of the State’. Annual Review of Anthropology 23:109-36.
  10. Scarry, Elaine (1985) ‘The Structure of Torture’, in The Body in Pain, pp27-59. 


Author biography:  Natalia Maystorovich Chulio recently was awarded her PhD and works in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Sydney. Her research interests include humanitarian and human rights law; transitional justice; the archaeological recovery of mass graves; and the capacity of social movements to elicit social, political and legal change as they seek justice for victims.  Her focus is on socio-legal research and qualitative methods in an attempt to merge her political and social interests with a scholarship which may enact social change. Since 2012 she has worked with the Asociación para la Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica (ARMH – Association for the Recovery of Historic Memory) in an attempt to draw attention to the difficulties experienced by victims and their relatives in the recuperation of their missing.

Tuesday, June 20, 2017

Sociology of Deviance and Difference

Camperdown Memorial Rest Park, Church St Newtown, Sydney. (14th, June,2017)
Alex Page and I are coordinating a Unit for Winter School, the Sociology of Deviance and Difference, and we wrote a brief note for the Unit of Study to convey the ethos and importance of such a topic. Here it is:

A Brief Note From Your Course Coordinators:

We would both like to formally welcome you to the Winter School version of Sociology of Deviance and Difference for 2017! In this intensive unit over the next two and half weeks we – Mathew Toll and Alex Page – will be working with you to unpack the nature of deviance and difference and ask questions like:  what is deviance? Is it socially constructed? And if so, how and why is it constructed in certain ways? Who gets to set the rules? Who gets to label someone a deviant? How is deviance and difference experienced? And, what are the relations of power at play that determine constructions of normalcy? Why this way and not another? These questions will inform the discussion of various social fields of practice to see who wins and who is deemed bad/mad/different and in need of sanction, disciplining, or exclusion.

From the outset, we want you to understand the direction this course through three kinds of stories:
  • Kinds of People Stories: deviance as rooted in the biological and psychological attributes of people.     
  • Kinds of Society Stories: deviance as norm-breaking, labelling processes, and the social construction of deviance and difference.  
  • Kinds of Power Stories: deviance and difference as an operation of power and struggle over who is considered normal.
Durkheim established a sociological understanding of deviance, kinds of society stories, and argues that norm-breaking rather than being a pathological aspect of society serve a set of key functions, not least norm-making. We always need to think about how the construction of deviance and difference are integral to a society, because even in a society of stains there are deviants: 

“Imagine a community of saints in an exemplary and perfect monastery. In it crime as such will be unknown, but faults that appear venial to the ordinary person will arouse the same scandal as does normal crime in ordinary consciences. If therefore that the community has the power to judge and punish, it will term such acts criminal and deal with them as such. It is for the same reason that the completely honourable man judges his slightest moral failings with a severity that the mass of people reserves for acts that are truly criminal. In former times acts of violence against the person were more frequent than they are today because respect for individual dignity was weaker. As it has increased, such crimes have become less frequent, but many acts which offended against that sentiment have been incorporated into the penal code, which did not previously include them.” 
- Emile Durkheim (1983, 100), Rules for a Sociological Method.
Foucault takes us further and argues that the disciplinary powers that act on people who are deviant or different are found in many institutions in modern society beyond formally punitive institutions.   He makes us think about how disciplinary and normalizing power spreads throughout the social body and impacts everyone: power is in all relations, forming and reforming people’s bodies and souls:

“The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the ‘social worker’-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements. The carceral network, in its compact or disseminated forms, with its systems of insertion, distribution, surveillance, observation, has been the greatest support, in modem society, of the normalizing power.”

 – Michel Foucault (1995, 304), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison

Our final quote comes from Vaneigem, who pushes us beyond the textbooks and into the reality of our own worlds:

“People who talk about revolution and class struggle without referring explicitly to everyday life, without understanding what is subversive about love and what is positive in the refusal of constraints - such people have a corpse in their mouth.”

- Raoul Vaneigem (2001, 26), The Revolution of Everyday Life.

This sentiment is vital for the Sociology of Deviance and Difference – vital for sociology. Vaneigem demands of us to connect theoretical tools and frameworks down to the social realities of lived experience. Not only is this a good use of your sociological imagination, we strive to do this because it also means you develop the skills to pull apart complex social phenomena in your own day-to-day lives! We believe is this the very foundation of a good sociological education. Maintaining norms and sectioning ‘deviants’ is a key way we ourselves exert power over others and this course aims to make us conscious of our own use of power.  

We would like to acknowledge Prof Karl Maton and Dr Nadine Ehlers for their help in constructing this course. Finally, we wish you the best throughout Winter School 2017, and are here to assist you in any way we can.

Mathew Toll and Alex Page